


syssec 

Part I

The Basic Idea


software

- sequence of instructions in memory
- logically divided in functions that call each other
 - function 'IE' calls function 'getURL' to read the corresponding page
- in CPU, the program counter contains the address in memory of the next instruction to execute
 - normally this is the next address (instruction 100 is followed by instruction 101, etc)
 - *not so with function call*



software

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


software

stack pointer (SP)
→ Points to last added entry
on the stack

stack

- so how does our CPU know where to return?
 - it keeps administration
 - on a 'stack'



real functions

→ variables


```
getURL ()
{
    char buf[10];
    read(keyboard,buf,64);
    get_webpage (buf);
}

IE ()
{
    getURL ();
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real functions

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



real functions
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
frame pointer (FP)
→ Points to start of this
function's stack frame

stack



real functions → variables

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


real functions → variables

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


real functions → variables

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
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


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
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```

on "return
from read"




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
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
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
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
```



Where is the vulnerability?

Exploit

```
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}  
IE ()  
{  
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}
```



You may also overwrite other things

- For instance:
 - Other variables that are also on the stack
 - Other addresses
 - Etc.

Memory Corruption

Final words Part I

- We have sketched only the most common memory corruption attack
 - many variations, e.g.:
 - heap $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ stack
 - more complex overflows
 - off-by-one
- But there are others also
 - integer overflows
 - format string attacks
 - double free
 - etc.
- Not now, perhaps later...